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Applying Transaction Cost Economics:
A Note on Biomass Supply Chains
Ira J. Altman, Dwight R. Sanders, and Chris R. Boessen
Agricultural supply chains, especially those from producer to first handler, are
relatively mature institutions. While agricultural economists often observe the
evolution of marketing structures in developing nations, it is a rare opportunity to
research a developing market within North America. The emerging bioenergy
industry—which relies on non-food crops such as straw—provides the potential
to research and potentially impact the development of new supply chains. Here,
we briefly review the literature related to biomass supply chains, pose a transaction
cost approach to studying their development, and then discuss the procurement
strategies of an industry leader: the Iogen Corporation.
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Bioenergy industries based on agricultural row crop waste (e.g., straw) and dedi-
cated energy crops (e.g., switch grass) hold the potential to reduce dependence on
fossil fuels, revitalize rural communities, and contribute to environmental improve-
ment. Many also argue that technologies for processing agricultural products into
renewable energy are nearing financial feasibility. However, transaction costs from
organizing biomass exchange may be an important non-technical barrier to commer-
cial development. The choices of procurement and marketing strategies are keys to
competing on transaction costs just as the choice of manufacturing technology is key
to competing on production costs.
While there is much research investigating bioenergy technology, other topics,
such as transaction costs, organizational decisions, and biomass supply chain issues,
remain under-researched. Row crop waste and energy crop supply chains are less
developed than other biomass-based renewable energy industries. The current U.S.
biopower industry is based on concentrated wood and food waste streams with
highly vertically integrated supply chains. Further, unlike traditional corn-to-ethanol
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production, where well-developed supply chains exist, row crop waste and energy
crop biomass supply channels will have to overcome significant organizational
hurdles. The current ad hoc supply systems involving informal contracting and barter
must evolve to more formal systems to meet the needs of large-scale processors. The
purpose of this paper is to use transaction cost economics to examine how the bio-
mass supply chain may evolve for one such processor, the Iogen Corporation.
In the following section of this paper, the biomass and bioenergy literature is
reviewed. Next, an explanation and application of transaction cost economics to the
general relationship between biomass producer and processor is provided to
demonstrate the use of the theory. The illustrative case of the Iogen Corporation is
then presented, with the underlying objective of examining Iogen’s procurement
strategy through the lens of transaction cost economics. A summary and concluding
remarks are given in the final section.
Biomass Supply Chains and Transaction Cost Economics
Biomass and bioenergy researchers have rarely applied an adequate organizational
theory to this nascent industry. Klass (1998) draws attention to this failure in the area
of storage and shipping of wood biomass. Further, van Loo and Koppejan (2003)
document examples where organizational adaptations have solved technological
problems. Their work underscores the importance of understanding and addressing
organizational issues within the biomass industry.
Current research on biomass supply chains is mixed. Downing, Volk, and
Schmidt (2005) suggest agricultural cooperatives as potential organizational
structures for research, financing, and exchange mechanisms in the bioenergy
industry. Alternatively, Overend (1993, p. 2) claims that the “industry must rely on
short-term contracts or the spot market for fuel purchases.” Both lines of research
suggest the relevant question: When are spot markets preferable, and when do more
integrated procurement systems better serve the bioprocessing industries? An
adequate organizational theory is required to provide a framework for addressing
this question.
Other authors have focused on logistic decisions such as biomass harvest,
transportation, storage, and preprocessing methods. These decisions must take into
account the type of crop—whether it is an energy crop like switch grass, or row crop
waste such as wheat straw. The processing technology also impacts logistics.
Atchison and Hettenhaus (2003) recommend a one-pass harvest system where
biomass waste is collected in conjunction with the grain harvest, and processing
plants are located near waterways to utilize barge transportation. A one-pass harvest
system, however, is less appropriate when the processing technology requires a
dry biomass product, which lends itself to a multi-pass harvest system (Atchison
and Hettenhaus). Transportation and processing issues are important to this industry
and have been considered by prior researchers (see Tembo, Epplin, and Huhnke,
2003; Bhat, English, and Ojo, 1992) in addition to the technological perspective
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within the context of transaction cost economics as specifically applied to the Iogen
Corporation.
Transaction cost economics (TCE) as an organizational theory was pioneered by
Coase (1937). Other organizational approaches include the incomplete contracting
approach associated with Hart (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990),
the measurement branch (Alchain and Demsetz, 1972; Jensen and Meckling, 1976),
as well as various business theories such as the resource-based theory. But one of the
most conceptually developed organizational theories is Williamson’s work on TCE
(1979, 1985, 1996). The behavioral assumptions of the TCE model include bounded
rationality and opportunism: individuals will break their promises if they can gain.
Williamson defines opportunism as an adjusted version of self-interest seeking, i.e.,
“self-interest seeking with guile” (Williamson, 1979, p. 234). In the biomass sector
we would expect economic circumstances to be highly variable depending on the
prices of fossil fuels, agronomic factors, and technological factors. This economic
environment creates the potential for incomplete contracts and opportunism as
potential trading partners try to establish new relationships.
All exchanges are subject to transaction costs. Transaction costs include ex ante
search and negotiation costs and ex post enforcement, monitoring, and renegotiation
costs. The assumption of positive transaction costs assures that disagreements arising
from contract incompleteness cannot be costlessly negotiated away. The crux of
TCE is the discriminating alignment hypothesis which states that economic actors
will “align transactions, which differ in their attributes, with alternative governance
structures, which differ in cost and competence, so as to realize a transaction cost
economizing result” (Williamson, 1996, p. 371).
Three attributes of the transaction are identified: asset specificity, frequency, and
uncertainty (Williamson, 1979). In TCE, special emphasis is placed on asset speci-
ficity. Asset specificity is defined as the value of assets in alternative uses. In this
way, asset specificity helps identify opportunity costs of assets used to support an
exchange as the key organizational determinant.
Several types of asset specificity are identified. Physical asset specificity is when
assets are tailored to meet the needs of a particular trading partner. Spatial asset
specificity occurs when location creates dependency. Three other types of asset
specificity include dedicated assets, when expansion investments are made to meet
the needs of a particular trading partner; human asset specificity or learning by
doing; and temporal asset specificity, where timing of the asset’s use is specific and
critical.
Asset specificity is assigned primary significance in Williamson’s TCE because
it creates bilateral dependence between otherwise independent actors. A situation of
ex ante independence may be transformed into ex post bilateral dependence where
trading parties are open to the potential of opportunism. In the case of low asset
specificity, independent parties are less subject to opportunism on the part of their
business relations since assets hold relatively high values in alternative uses. TCE
holds that the relative efficiency of alternative organizational forms depends on asset
specificity.110   Spring 2007 Journal of Agribusiness
In potential biomass industries, producers and processors are indeed independent.
However, once they make specialized investments that support the biomass trans-
action, they typically become bilaterally dependent on each other’s actions. Hence,
the choice of organizational form or biomass supply chain strategy becomes central
to industry development.
For bioenergy industries, the relevant assets and investments include the processing
facility or power plant, the biomass harvesting equipment, storage, and transpor-
tation equipment, as well as the producer’s time and managing effort. The degree of
specificity of these assets will likely vary, implying that a range of organizational
and supply chain mechanisms may be efficient, depending on the technological and
geographical circumstances for a particular plant.
Physical asset specificity will be an issue for the processor, when the processing
technology is not flexible with respect to quantity, quality, and type of biomass feed-
stock. In this case, processors may consider longer-term contracts, vertical coordin-
ation, or even vertical integration strategies as advantageous. Conversely, flexible
processing technology with respect to biomass quantity and quality should result in
a preference for flexible organizational options such as spot markets which allow
facilities to switch to the lowest cost fuel.
Biomass producers will have high asset specificity if they invest in specialized
machinery to produce, collect, transport, and store the biomass—in which case they
may desire a longer-term committed relationship with new processors. Alternatively,
where biomass producers already own the physical production assets, they should
prefer to utilize spot markets, so that they are free to either sell or use the biomass
depending on the highest value. For instance, they can choose to withhold supplies
in order to ensure soil fertility or to sell to a local livestock industry. Producers with
relatively low asset specificity will be unlikely to sacrifice these alternatives by
committing to long-term supply relationships.
Industry supply chains are likely to develop more quickly if the trading partners—
producers and processors—desire the same type of relationship. For instance, if a
flexible production plant with low asset specificity is built in an area where farmers
already own biomass harvesting equipment, such as haying equipment, then a spot
market for biomass feedstock should quickly develop. Likewise, if a highly asset-
specific plant were to locate in an area where farmers had to invest in new biomass
production technologies, then longer-term supply contracts would likely emerge
between processors and biomass producers.
Procurement processes may hinder the industry when the asset specificity of the
processor and biomass producer do not align. If a processor plans to enter an area
where producers do not own the necessary production equipment, then it will be
challenging to get producers to respond and invest in equipment if they expect spot
market transactions. To induce investment by producers, processors might need to
offer more committed relationships, even though they will increase transaction costs
compared to a spot market. Clearly, the accompanying transaction costs must be
considered when choosing the supply chain strategy.Altman, Sanders, and Boessen A Note on Biomass Supply Chains   111
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There are several questions that must be answered to predict the most efficient
supply chain strategy in the emerging bioenergy industries.
P First, will the processing technology be flexible with respect to the biomass
feedstock?
P Second, will the processor be entering an area where farmers already own the
necessary equipment to serve the industry?
P Finally, will special biomass production techniques—i.e., the development of
human assets—be expected from biomass producers?
The answers to these questions will determine if low-cost spot markets develop or
if the industry evolves long-term supply contracts or even cooperatives that entail
much higher administrative costs.
Next, we look at one company’s approach to addressing these issues in biomass
procurement. While there are a number of alternative procurement situations that
could be examined (see Atchison and Hettenhaus, 2003), here we chose to focus on
a private firm, the Iogen Corporation. Iogen is very near the commercialization stage
of its technology; therefore, the results of this investigation may have greater rele-
vancy for the developing biomass industry.
The Case of Iogen
The Iogen Corporation is a Canadian biotech company that is a leader in scientific
research to produce cellulose-based ethanol from straw, corn stover, and dedicated
energy crops. Iogen’s genetically modified enzyme process, enzymatic hydrolysis,
produces sugars from the cellulose and hemicellulose portions of the biomass. The
sugars can then be fermented with traditional yeast strains to produce ethanol. With
financial investments from Petro Canada, the Canadian Government, Royal Dutch
Shell, and Goldman Sachs (Brown, 2006; McCoy, 2006), Iogen is nearing commer-
cialization of the technology. Currently, Iogen is investigating where to locate the
first cellulose-to-ethanol plant. In this section we present the supply chain strategies
with which Iogen is experimenting and examine them in the context of transaction
cost economics.
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Iogen is targeting a processing plant that would require 1,500 tons per day of
wheat straw feedstock to produce 45 million gallons of ethanol per year. The cost
of such a plant will be $300S$400 million, nearly 10 times the cost of a similar corn-
based ethanol facility (Brown, 2006). The feedstock requirement will pull from
approximately 1,000 acres per day of land resources. This quantity requirement,
in combination with the innate bulkiness of straw, makes an efficient supply chain112   Spring 2007 Journal of Agribusiness
strategy essential, and it may be the key organizational variable to successful com-
mercialization.
At present, Iogen has signed production contracts with farmers in three locations,
two in western Canada and one in Idaho, with the intention of building a processing
facility in one of these locations, depending on the financial incentives from various
levels of government (Pratt, 2005). Iogen has chosen to utilize standard production
contracts signed with individual farmers. One feature of this relationship is that
Iogen has a 5S6 year option to buy the producers’ straw. Depending on where the
plant is ultimately located, Iogen will exercise its option on contracts for that area
and allow the other contracts to expire (Pratt).
Farmers have a choice between two pricing schemes: a fixed price option of
approximately $10 per ton (laid in the field) or a variable price tied to the price of
oil. In the variable pricing system, straw prices would then vary from $7S$15 per ton
(laid in the field) depending on the price of crude oil (Pratt, 2005). In concept,
variable pricing allows the farmer to manage input cost risk—fertilizer and diesel—
which should also move with crude oil prices. Farmers have the option to sell all
their straw in alternating years or half their straw every year, allowing them some
flexibility to manage soil structure with the residue.
In terms of harvest and delivery, Iogen could have producers responsible for both
functions by negotiating a delivered price. Instead, Iogen has chosen to rely on custom
harvest and delivery through separate contracts (Pratt, 2005). Specifically, Iogen
contracts with producers for only the biomass supply laid in the field, and relies on
custom operators to complete harvest and delivery. Clearly, this approach requires two
separate contracting relationships. A potential third option would have been to contract
with producers for harvested biomass, but not the delivery function. Although not yet
designed or offered, the harvest and delivery contracts will necessarily include access
to the land, baling, collection, and storage of the bales, as well as timely delivery
through the marketing year. Given the bulkiness of the feedstock and the land mass
required, the collection, storage, and long-haul transport will create considerable costs.
It is not perfectly clear why Iogen chose dual contracting arrangements, but TCE can
provide some insight into this arrangement and how it might evolve.
Iogen’s strategy of pursuing longer-term contracts may stem from the corpora-
tion’s own asset specificity. Iogen’s modified enzymes are feedstock specific,
requiring a certain quantity and quality of wheat straw. Switching production to
other feedstocks, such as barley straw, would require fairly expensive “re-tooling”
of the enzymatic process. Therefore, Iogen will benefit from longer-term contracts,
even with the higher administrative costs. From the wheat producer’s standpoint, the
production of straw laid in the field requires minimal additional asset investment
beyond the swathing and harvest methods currently employed. So, the flexibility of
low-cost spot markets may be their preferred marketing alternative. However, the
firm that harvests, stores, and delivers straw will need to invest in specific assets to
perform these functions, especially since the proposed locations are not in traditional
straw- or hay-producing areas. Consequently, the custom harvester has high asset
specificity and will desire longer-term contracts.Altman, Sanders, and Boessen A Note on Biomass Supply Chains   113
Based on these asset characteristics, TCE suggests that longer-term contracting
arrangements should develop between Iogen and the custom harvesters. However,
since the producers have low asset specificity, and an agronomic need to be flexible
on harvesting straw, they may naturally prefer the low costs and flexibility associ-
ated with spot markets. These factors could prompt the development of a spot market
for laid-in-the-field straw, where the custom harvester buys spot straw in the field
and sells it under a long-term contract to Iogen. Of course, a number of alternative
scenarios are possible, including the formation of straw harvesting and marketing
cooperatives. Likewise, the development of new technological processes, such as
mobile processing equipment, could alter asset specificity and hence the organiza-
tional structure. Still, TCE provides an economic roadmap for considering how the
biomass supply chain may evolve.
Summary and Conclusions
This note takes an organization approach to introducing biomass supply chain
strategies. First, the need for an organizational theory is demonstrated in the existing
biomass and bioenergy literature. Second, a specific organization economics theory,
transaction cost economics, is explained and applied to the biomass industry using
the example of the Iogen Corporation.
Transaction cost economics suggests that a firm’s level of asset specificity will
determine its contracting preferences. Iogen’s choice of dual long-term contracts
with both producers and harvesters may stem from the asset rigidity of enzymatic
hydrolysis. Under the dual system instigated by Iogen, harvesters—who invest in
assets to harvest, store, and deliver straw—may also prefer longer-term contracts.
However, producers—who make no incremental asset investment—will likely desire
the flexibility of spot markets. Therefore, the supply chain structure could evolve to
a spot market for in-the-field straw with long-term supply contracts between
harvesters and Iogen. Alternatively, farmers could essentially share harvesting assets
through the formation of a harvesting and marketing cooperative.
Regardless of the ultimate form, it is important that the supply chain evolve in an
efficient manner so as not to create a barrier to commercialization. This research
presents just one possible way to study and guide the development of this emerging
supply chain. The bioenergy sector offers enormous economic potential for agricul-
ture. Moreover, it represents a rare opportunity for academics to participate in the
evolution of a new agricultural sector within a developed economy. Agricultural
economists should be working closely with agribusiness leaders to overcome supply
chain and other economic and organizational barriers facing the bioenergy industry.
References
Alchain, A., and H. Demsetz. (1972, December). “Production, information costs, and
economic organization.” American Economic Review 62, 777S795.114   Spring 2007 Journal of Agribusiness
Atchison, J., and J. Hettenhaus. (2003). “Innovative methods for corn stover collect-
ing, handling, storage, and transporting.” Report No. ACO-1-31042-01, National
Renewable Energy Laboratory, Golden, CO.
Bhat, M. G., B. English, and M. Ojo. (1992). “Regional costs of transporting bio-
mass feedstocks.” In J. S. Cundiff (ed.), Liquid Fuels from Renewable Resources:
Proceedings of an Alternative Energy Conference, 14S15 December 1992 (pp.
50S57). St. Joseph, MI: American Society of Agricultural Engineers.
Brown, R. C. (2003). Biorenewable Resources: Engineering New Products from
Agriculture. Ames, IA: Blackwell Publishing.
———. (2006, February 6). “Biorefinery breakthrough.” Fortune, p. 88.
Coase, R. H. (1937). “The nature of the firm.” Economica 4, 33S55.
Downing, M., T. Volk, and D. Schmidt. (2005). “Development of new generation
cooperatives in agriculture for renewable energy research, development, and dem-
onstration projects.” Biomass and Bioenergy 28, 425S434.
Grossman, S., and O. Hart. (1986, August). “The costs and benefits of ownership:
A theory of vertical and lateral integration.” Journal of Political Economy 94,
691S719.
Hart, O., and J. Moore. (1990). “Property rights and the nature of the firm.” Journal
of Political Economy 98(6), 1119S1158.
Jensen, M., and W. Meckling. (1976, October). “Theory of the firm: Managerial
behavior, agency costs, and capital structure.” Journal of Financial Economics
3, 305S360.
Klass, D. (1998). Biomass for Renewable Energy, Fuels, and Chemicals. San Diego:
Academic Press.
McCoy, M. (2006, May 8). “Bioethanol boost.” Chemical & Engineering News,
p. 10.
Overend, R. (1993). “Biomass power industry: Assessment of key players and
approaches for DOE and industry interaction.” Golden, CO: National Renewable
Energy Laboratory.
Pratt, S. (2005, March 24). “Shopping for straw.” Western Producer, p. 110.
Tembo, G., F. M. Epplin, and R. L. Huhnke. (2003, December). “Integrative invest-
ment appraisal of a lignocellulosic biomass-to-ethanol industry.” Journal of Agri-
cultural and Resource Economics 28(3), 611S633.
van Loo, S., and J. Koppejan. (2003). Handbook on Biomass Combustion and Co-
firing. Task 32, International Energy Agency. Enschede, Netherlands: Twente
University Press.
Williamson, O. E. (1979). “Transaction-cost economics: The governance of con-
tractual relations.” Journal of Law and Economics 22, 233S261.
———. (1985). The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. New York: Free Press.
———. (1996). The Mechanisms of Governance. New York: Oxford University
Press.